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INTRODUCTION
Large commercial aircraft is one of the areas in which the
United States accuse European governments of unfair trade
practices. AIRBUS Industries is undoubtedly heavily support-
ed by subsidies from all participating countries. From 1970
up to today at least 11-12 Billion US-$ have been paid by
European governments; some American estimates of that sup-
port come to as much as 20 Billion US-$. The development of
the A330/340 and 321 will require several billion more in
the next few years. These payments were caused by the
decision of European governments in the late 1960's to
support market entry of an European competitor in the market
for large transport aircraft.
Up to now these subsidies have been predominantly paid for
the financing of start-up investments of the now existing
and planned fleet of aircraft, the A300, A310, A320, A330,
A340, most likely the A321, and possibly a military
freighter. This situation might change in the future,
because the German government has agreed to grant production
subsidies under specific circumstances. By the end of 1989
Daimler-Benz will merge with MBB, the German partners of
Airbus Industrie, and a precondition of Daimler-Benz for
acquiring the risky commercial aircraft business was a long
term exchange rate guarantee. Since aircraft is sold in US-
Dollars worldwide this could amount to a production subsidy
if the DM/$ exchange rate stays at a lower level than today
for a considerable time.
In this paper the impact of subsidized market entry of
Airbus over the next 20 years is simulated. The welfare
effects of this subsidized entry are assessed by comparing
the actual allocation to an American monopoly and alter-
natively to an American duopoly. Then the effects of an- 3 -
ad-valorem subsidy for Airbus on allocation and welfare are
simulated. Finally, the impact of potential retaliation by
the American administration on competition among the
European and American producers ia analyzed.
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Today there are three large producers of large transport
aircraft: BOEING (over 50% market share), AIRBUS (30-35%),
McDonnell Douglas (10-15%). Other civil aircraft forms a
relatively minor part of the industry in terms of value. In
the United States large transport aircraft covers about 70%
of all civil aircraft industry shipments. Light transport
aircraft, helicopters, business aircraft, and other aircraft
account for the rest (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986).
The three large producers are embedded in a network of sub-
contractors which supply parts of the aircraft. Most impor-
tantly the engines amounting to 20-30% of the value of an
aircraft are developed by outside companies. Avionics,
systems, and components (brakes, tires etc.) are often sub-
contracted as well.
The market is small in terms of number of aircraft sold, but
each aircraft is an expensive product. 400 to 500 large
transport aircraft are expected to be sold every year with
yearly fluctuations. Aircraft prices range from $ 25 to $ 30
million for a Boeing 737, to $ 30 to $ 32 million for an
A320, to around $ 120 million for a Boeing 747. The rela-
tively small number of aircraft sold goes hand in hand with
a long product cycle. It takes 5-6 years from launch to
first delivery. Then an aircraft has a product cycle of at
least 20-25 years of production during which it may be
upgraded to new technological standards.- 4 -
Large transport aircraft have a complex production technol-
ogy which results in strong learning effects. An essential
part of learning appears in the assembly of an aircraft.
Craftsmanship and timing of thousands of activities is re-
quired there. Such experience is embodied in the workforce
and accumulates with the number of aircraft that have been
produced. There is world-wide consensus that aircraft pro-
duction exhibits a learning elasticity of 0.2, i.e. produc-
tion cost decrease by 20% with a doubling of output (BERG/
TIELKE-HOSEMANN, 1987, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986).
(See figure Al in the appendix for some empirical examples).
Whereas start-up investments and R&D are costly in absolute
terms, economies of scale are dominated by the learning
effect which amount to 90% of the overall economies of scale
(see below). Some production stages are not specific to a
particular type of aircraft, such that learning effects
which are realized in the production of a generic aircraft
can influence marginal cost of producing another generic
aircraft. Such cross effects are strong for updated versions
of an aircraft, the socalled "derivatives". These effects
can be captured by economies of scope.
Industry characteristics can then be summarized under
- static economies of scale (R&D and start-up investment)
- dynamic economies of scale (learning in production)
- economies of scope (cross effects of learning).
COMPETITION
Aircraft producers compete in essentially two ways. There is
first the long-run decision about product choice and capac-
ity. The demand in each segment even over a long time hori-
zon is small in terms of the number of aircraft. 3000 to- 5 -
4000 units each in the short and medium range market and
around 2000 units in the long-range market are the expected
market size over the next 20 years. Since learning effects
are embodied in the work force, capacity choice becomes the
crucial long-run decision variable.
There is, of course, limited information about future de-
mand. Market forecasts by the large producers over the next
20 years, however, do not differ greatly suggesting that the
game is played under identical expectations. Figure A2 in
the appendix illustrates the different types of aircraft
which are currently offered by the three producers according
to range and seating capacity. In each of the market segment
- short range narrow-bodied, short and medium range
wide-bodied, and long-range aircraft - Airbus and Boeing
offer competing generic aircraft with possibly a number of
derivatives.
Once capacity is determined, aircraft producers have limited
choice over short-run output levels. They bargain with air-
lines in their day-to-day marketing activities over the
price of aircraft. Airlines seem to make extensive use of
repeated negotiations with the suppliers of an aircraft for
a specific market segment. Competition takes the form of a
price game at given capacity levels, where the outcome of
the long-run quantity game then becomes a restriction in the
short-run price game. If demand turns out to be larger than
expected, firms will produce at their capacity limit and
choose prices which maximize profits. For unexpectedly low
demand the price game may drive prices down to marginal cost
levels. In extreme cases so-called "white tails" are pro-
duced, i.e. aircraft are produced without a customer in
sight.- 6 -
MARKET ENTRY
Entry in a market such as that for large transport aircraft
is an expensive and time consuming effort. Dynamic and
static economies of scale together with economies of scope
give incumbent firms a considerable competitive advantage.
It is therefore not surprising that market entry of AIRBUS
was accompanied by heavy involvement of European govern-
ments. After several commercially unsuccessful projects
European aircraft producers were not willing to take the
risks of yet another gamble.
When in the 1960's European aerospace firms were considering
to enter the market for large transport with a new genera-
tion of aircraft, this market was almost completely dominat-
ed by the three American producers - Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, and Lockheed. Previously produced European aircraft
was not successful commercially and the outlook was that no
non-American producer could compete in size with the three
firms. In this situation market entry can be viewed as the
first of a three stage decision process. First, the commit-
ment of European governments to subsidize the launch of a
new aircraft was necessary since apparently financing on
capital markets without state support was not possible.
Secondly, firms had to decide which market segment to enter
and they had to choose a capacity which allowed them to
capture the learning effects of large scale production and
at the same time kept prices at a profitable level. Finally,
once the two decisions are made they had to compete with the
other producers in the day-to-day business of selling their
product.
The first decision must be made under great uncertainty and
not only economic but also political arguments govern this
process. Industrial policy aspects such as the civil-mili-
tary interaction in the aerospace industry were important.- 7 -
From the perspective of European firms government support
turned out to be essential. Not only the financial burden
for the launch of a completely new aircraft is high, but the
commitment of governments to support market entry could also
prevent incumbent firms from starting a price war in the
hope of stripping the entrant of its financial resources
(BRANDER/SPENCER, 1983). When in the "Bonner Protokoll" of
September 1967 the British, French, and German governments
gave their support to the launch of the A300, the first
stage decision was expected to be finished.
Once the A300 came to the market in 1974 airlines were not
enthusiastic about buying a new aircraft from a new produc-
er. Parts, maintenance, training etc. did not fit the prod-
ucts of Boeing, Lockheed, or McDonnell Douglas. The A300 was
designed to close the "window" for a high capacity short to
medium range transport aircraft. While this window surely
existed, the market opportunities in this segment were un-
clear. Lockheed and McDonnel Douglas were already engaged in
head-to-head competition with their L1011 and DC-10. Their
low prices could make their aircraft competitive even in the
shorter range market segment of the A300. It became clear
that Airbus had to supply a complete family of aircraft in
order to stay in the market in the long-run. This also meant
a new commitment of the participating governments to finance
the new types of aircraft, since the A300 and later the A310
were not even close to their break-even point.
The political decision in the 1960's to support a European
civil aircraft industry by subsidizing the development of
one new aircraft, the A300, has over time turned into the
need to subsidize the market entry of a producer of a com-
plete family of aircraft. Subsidies and guarantees are given
today for the development and launch of the A3 30 and the
A340. But this is not necessarily the last step. Airbus is- 8 -
not yet a producer which has internalized learning and scale
effects in the same way as the established producers. The
cost disadvantage of later market entry still exists. It
competes in market segments in which Boeing has already
realized large learning effects and is able to produce at
lower marginal cost.
Such a situation invites governments not only to support
market entry, but to subsidize the domestic firm in order to
capture rents from the foreign firm. BRANDER/SPENCER (1985)
have shown that in a Cournot-Nash game subsidies paid by one
government to its domestic producer increases profits and
welfare. The question arises what Europe could gain by not
only supporting market entry but also by subsidizing pro-
duction of its domestic producer. Up to now such subsidies
have not been paid in significant amounts, but their
potential impact will also be simulated.
THE MODEL
For the purpose of this paper the political decision to sup-
port market entry is taken as given. Up to now this support
has taken the form of financing the launch-investment. Such
fixed cost subsidies do not affect capacity decisions of the
producers. Government support, therefore, only makes cred-
ible that the entrant stays in the market even if entry is
not profitable over the planning horizon. Entry deterring
pricing strategies of the incumbent producer therefore are
not rational. With entry so to speak "exogenuously" given,
the game amounts to a Cournot-Nash game in capacity over the
planning horizon. The possibility that European governments
will pay and may already have paid production subsidies is
taken up later. Past production subsidies and marketing aid
are small compared to the subsidization of the launch in-— 9 —
vestment (COOPERS & LYBRAND, 1988). The amount of production
subsidies to be paid in the future is unknown, since these
subsidies are made dependent on the development of exchange
rates.
The short-run price game naturally can not be empirically
investigated, since it depends on the actual development of
demand in the future. Historical examples show that aircraft
prices fluctuate with demand; in the 1979-1983 rebates of up
to 20% were not uncommon according to airline officials.
Apart from such demand fluctuations, real aircraft prices
tend to remain constant over a product cycle. The focus will
be exclusively on the capacity game played between two pro-
ducers which one could imagine as being Airbus Industrie and
Boeing. McDonnell Douglas is left out of the model, since it
has not developed a really new aircraft and seems to func-
tion more like a competitive fringe. Until the Pentagon
issued a large order for military tanker aircraft recently,
there had been doubts whether McDonnell Douglas would stay
in the civil market at all.
The model represents a stylized picture of the industry. In
particular the network of production with a large number of
subcontractors is ignored. The producers are modelled as de-
cision units and production units. This approach implicitly
assumes that subcontractors have similar production tech-
nologies as the main firm. An alternative model would only
investigate the value added inside the two main producers
and assume that intermediate products are bought from a com-
petitive market, a less realistic assumption.
SUPPLY DECISION
Since an important part of economies of scale of aircraft
production are incorporated in the learning of the workforce
over time, a producer must essentially decide what the pro-- 10 -
duction capacity for a particular aircraft will be. In real-
ity this will be a sequential decision with updates as time
goes on and external parameters such as demand change.
Nevertheless capacity decisions do have a long-run character
even if they are not made once and for all. A producer i
therefore faces for a given capacity a flow of production
y. . The cumulative production x.T at time T is then
XiT " JS
 Vit
Capacity choice is then equivalent to the choice of x-T.
Each producer has a cost function in terms of cumulated out-
put which incorporates learning effects, fixed cost, and
economies of scope. For the purpose of this model the "CES-
Cost-Function" proposed by BAUMOL ET AL. (1982) is chosen.
It can incorporate all the desired features. Dropping the


















It is assumed that both producers have the same cost func-
tion, i.e. they are equally efficient. Since the incumbent
has already realized learning effects he may be on a lower
part of his learning curve thus having lower marginal cost.- 11 -
The multi-product cost function C.(x.) has the parameter
restriction 0<9.<l Vi, if there are economies of scope in
the production of x.
In the one-product case, the cost function reduces to the
classic learning curve
- SC(x) _ BR8 68-1
with learning elasticity
(4) n = J39-1
All producers face the same expected inverse demand function







where x, = E x., K i=i iK
-k = (1,..,k-l,k+l,..,m)
Each producer produces in each market segment an identical
product which is subject to cross price effects from other
market segments. For the model simulation a linear demand
representation was chosen.
The optimal capacity choice of the two producers, i=(A,B),
is found as the solution of a Cournot-Nash game with cumu-
lated output x., as the strategic variables. The reaction
functions have the familiar form. The optimal strategy of








with G, = price elasticity of demand for product k.
(xA,xfi) with xA = (*ii/• • •/*im) / (i=A,B), is a Nash-Equi-
librium if it satisfies equations (6) for all i=A,B and
k=(1,...,m).
CALIBRATION
The effects of market entry cannot be empirically investi-
gated with historical data since Airbus is only in the
process of becoming a producer of a complete family of air-
craft and none of its products have reached the end of a
product cycle. The approach taken here relies on the history
of production of Airbus and Boeing up to 1986 and then uses
demand forecasts of the large producers up to the year 2006
as an empirical basis for the calibration of the model. This
time period covers a complete product cycle for most
aircraft types which are modelled here. The Airbus A330 and
A340 are the exception, because they will not enter the mar-
ket before 1992. Therefore demand forecasts for the long-
range market will not be an entirely adequate description of
the demand over the product cycle for these two aircraft
types.
Demand forecasts were available for the period 1987 to the
year 2000 by Boeing (Boeing Civil Aircraft Company, 1987),
to 2001 by McDonnell Douglas (McDonnell Douglas, 1986), andBibliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
to 2006 by Airbus (Airbus Industrie, 1987). The McDonnell
Douglas and Boeing forecasts expect an overall demand for
about 5700 large transport aircraft which if projected to
2006 would predict demand to be about 8100 aircraft. The
Airbus forecast is more optimistic in predicting a total
market for 9797 airplanes. Although all three producer oper-
ate with differently defined market segments thus making
comparisons difficult, the main difference can be attributed
to a much larger Airbus prediction for the market for short
to medium range wide body aircraft. In the light of recent
experiences with airport congestion this trend towards
larger aircraft seems realistic.
For the calibration of the model three market segments were
defined: A market for short to medium range narrow-body air-
craft (S), one for short to medium range wide-body aircraft
(M), and one for long range wide-body aircraft (L). For the
segment S the more conservative estimate was used, mainly
since McDonnell Douglas' MD80's compete in this segment but
are not explicitly modelled and because of the recent trend
towards larger aircraft. The Airbus estimate of about 3200
aircraft for segment M was adopted. The 1750 aircraft in
segment L are closer to the projected Boeing estimate than
to the Airbus and McDonnell Douglas forecasts. Since the
A 340 as a competitor for the Boeing 747 in the long range
market segment will not enter service before 1993 this is a
conservative estimate if the market over the whole product
cycle is the basis for capacity decisions. In summary, the
three market segments are calibrated to the following bench-
marks :
xs=3500 xM=3200 xL=1750.
Listed market prices do not exist for large transport air-
craft. Different customers getting different rebates, vary-
ing specifications of airplanes, and different arrangements- 14 -
concerning training, spare parts, and maintenance make price
documentation difficult. The prices used here are average
prices derived from listed contracts (INTERAVIA) and inter-
views . They are modelled in constant prices and calibrated





Technological characteristics are the launch investment
which is taken as fix cost. For aircraft launched before
1975 an estimate of $ 3 billion was taken (U.S. Department
of Commerce, 1986). Later aircraft was assumed to have
launch cost of $ 4 billion (The Economist, 1988). Learning
effects are generally believed to be strong. A learning
elasticity of 0.2 is widely accepted as the correct bench-
mark for decreases in marginal cost. In the present model
with output in the range of one to three thousand one can
compute the contribution of fix cost and learning to the
economies of scale directly. It turns out that launch in-
vestment accounts for only about 10% of the overall econ-
omies of scale.
Aircraft producers do not reveal marginal costs and the
synergy effects among the production of different types of
aircraft. Airbus officials, however claim that Airbus
Industry has reached the same efficiency as their American
competitors. Since no other verifiable information is avail-
able it is assumed that each producer has the same cost of
producing the first airplane.
Their marginal cost may however differ widely at some point
in time since their aircraft were launched at different
times. Suppose two producers have the same constant produc-
tion rate and the same cost function but started production
at different times. The difference in marginal cost at some
point in time is then given by the distance between the two- 15 -
marginal cost curves. This difference becomes smaller the
larger cumulative production is. With the relative small
number of aircraft produced this difference is of particular
importance to the aircraft industry. For the model calibra-
tion accumulated production of Boeing 737, 757, 767, and 747
and Airbus A300 and A310 in each market segment up to 1987
entered the cost function as already acquired learning
effects.
Since demand for transport aircraft is derived demand, the
shape of the demand curve depends on the elasticity of de-
mand for air transport which is relatively low due to the
absence of substitutes, and on the technology of producing
air transport services. The price elasticity of demand for
air transport seems to lie somewhere between -1.5 (KRAVIS et
al., 1982) and -2.85 (commercial US domestic passenger air
service; BALDWIN/KRUGMAN, 1987). The Baldwin/Krugman esti-
mate is based on a market with larger cross price elastici-
ties. Therefore the "true" price elasticity for world air
transport will most likely be closer to the Kravis estimate.
For large airlines the cost share of aircraft amounts to at
most 20% of total operating cost and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between aircraft and other inputs is low. There-
fore the price elasticity of demand for aircraft in general
will be rather small, most likely below one.
This finding does not fit the assumed Cournot-Nash framework
of a capacity game, since it requires a much larger elasti-
city in order to attain an equilibrium. An alternative at
this point would be to give up the notion of a capacity game
and to look for different models which might more adequately
describe competition in the aircraft industry without vio-
lating estimated parameters. KRUGMAN/BRAINARD (1988) have
tried alternative approaches, but have not made the big
breakthrough yet. The other alternative is to postulate the- 16 -
capacity game and to determine demand elasticities in the
calibration procedure. This, of course, leads to elastici-
ties which are higher than those theoretically derived.
In this paper the latter choice was taken, i.e. elasticities
are treated as endogenous in this model. It is assumed that
identical firms would earn a rate of return on turnover of
about 5.5% and the demand function is accordingly calibrated
to this rate of return. The resulting direct price elas-
ticities are larger than -2 and in the long range market
close to -1 which is as large as one can get in a Cournot-
Nash model as it is presented here. Although a rate of
return of 5,5% on turnover is rather arbitrary, the possible
range of rates compatible with the model is small and the
results are not sensitive to alternative values (see KLEP-
PER, 1990).
The parameter value for the degree of economies of scope had
to be chosen arbitrarily. Its value of 0=.97 can be inter-
preted as follows: The introduction of a new generic air-
craft when the firm has already experienced learning effects
of about 1000 older and different aircraft reduces marginal
cost by some 30% compared to the situation where it produces
its very first airplane as e.g. in the case of the A300.
For the base case calibration of the market starting from
1987 Boeing and Airbus had already internalized learning
effects in each market segment as shown in table 1. The
numbers refer to Boeings 737s, 757, 767, and 747 and to
Airbus' A300/310. Older aircraft like the 727 or the 707 are
ignored.- 17 -












Source: Interavia; current issues.
BASE CASE RESULTS
The result of the base case calibration are summarized in
table 2. Under the assumption of equal technologies for both
producers output in the Nash equilibrium varies due to the
cost advantages of previous learning. In market segment S
Boeing's marginal cost advantage is 23% resulting in a mar-
ket share of 31% for Airbus and leaving 69% for Boeing. In
segment M where Airbus has a slight advantage through the
early launch of the A300, a marginal cost advantage of 6%
translates into a 53% market share. Similarly for segment L
with cost differentials of 15% and market shares of 45% for
Airbus, resp. 55% for Boeing.







































The expected profitability of the activities of the two pro-
ducers can be computed either over the complete product
cycle of their products, i.e. by including the sales prior
to the start of the time horizon of the calibration, or for
the time horizon of the calibration and before separately.
The following table presents all three computations. For
simplicity the prices of aircraft prior to the calibration
period are set equal to the calibrated prices. This under-
estimates the profitability of Boeing in a period where it
has a monopoly in the long range market with its 747 and
also sold aircraft which is not counted here such as the
727.
Table 3: REVENUES, COSTS, AND PROFITS ($ Billion)
REVENUE































The summary in table 3 shows how the late entry of Airbus
affects profitability and production well into the next
century. Airbus would have almost broken even by then, but
Boeing will have a rate of return of 12.6%. For the period
from 1987 to 2006 both Airbus and Boeing are profitable, if
the start-up investment and high learning cost of the period
to 1987 are not counted. These numbers give a rough indica-- 19 -
tion of the cost disadvantage of Airbus in the 30 years
after its market entry. At the end of this period the com-
parison is not entirely correct, since by that time in the
market segments S and L Boeing will supply aircraft types
which are at the end of their product cycle, whereas Airbus
has aircraft in the segments S and L which are still relat-
ively new. Therefore Boeing will during the time under in-
vestigation face development costs for a new generation of
aircraft.
WELFARE
In order to assess the welfare consequences of government
supported market entry, a fictitious market structure
without this entry has to be used as a reference allocation.
One can imagine two scenarios which could have become reali-
ty since 1970. If, on the one hand, the process of concen-
tration in the aircraft industry would have continued in the
1970's as it has done in the decades before and Airbus would
not have entered the market, Boeing might have eventually
become a monopoly. If, on the other hand, the market is
large enough for two or more producers and Lockheed or
McDonnell Douglas were efficient producers, a duopoly like
in the current situation might have emerged. The difference
would be that the market would have two established produ-
cers instead of one new entrant and one incumbent. Both
alternatives are simulated as benchmarks for the effects of
alternative market structures.
Monopoly is simulated by leaving all parameters unchanged,
except that there is only one producer, Boeing. Accumulated
output in the monopoly situation is slightly smaller but not
by a large amount. Only in the long range market segment the
monopoly will supply almost 20% less aircraft. Prices rise- 20 -
between 3% and 16%. Profits to the monopolist almost triple
such that the rate of return over the whole product cycle
increases from 12.5% in the base case to 27% in the monopoly
case.
The second alternative is a duopoly with established pro-
ducers of equal efficiency such that they are on the same
points of their learning curves. Consequently they will
share the market equally. This situation is simulated by
assuming that at the beginning of the calibration period the
same number of aircraft in each market segment has already
been produced as in the base case. But this time the pro-
duction is also shared equally by both producers. Only in
the short range narrow-body market the overall output de-
viates significantly from the base case. This is induced by
the large learning incorporated in 1070 aircraft produced
prior to 1987 in the base case. Otherwise there is little
deviation in the allocation from the base case.
Whereas the regional distribution of producer surplus is
easy to determine, consumer surplus has to be approximated
by the distribution of air-traffic. Forecasted regional mar-
ket shares (AIRBUS INDUSTRIE 1987) were used to distribute
consumer welfare among Europe, the United States, and the
rest of the world.
Table 4 summarizes the welfare effects of Airbus market
entry when it is compared to a monopoly and when compared to
a duopoly. If a monopoly were the alternative market struc-
ture, market entry of Airbus could be considered successful
from a consumer's point of view, but the overall welfare
impact is negative. A consumer surplus gain of $ 36.8
billion is dominated by the loss of producer surplus of
$ 110.4 billion most of which is the monopoly profit of
Boeing. The regional distribution reveals welfare gains to
Europe and the rest of the world, whereas in North-America,
i.e. the United States, consumers gain and producers loose.- 21 -
Table 4: DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT










































The European producer surplus figures in table 4 do not in-
clude government subsidies. If indeed the projected $ 20
billion subsidies were paid by European governments and
financed by European tax payers there would be a redistribu-
tion of consumer and producer surplus. Market entry would
cost European consumers roughly $ 10 billion, but total wel-
fare to Europe would remain unchanged. Taking these subsi-
dies into account, government supported market entry by Air-
bus as an anti-monopoly policy - as it has been claimed by
European governments - did indeed help consumers, but only
those outside of Europe.- 22 -
If market entry of Airbus is compared to the hypothetical
situation of a duopoly with equal, mature producers a sur-
prising welfare effect emerges. Overall welfare in the base
case is by $ 5.9 billion higher than in the reference situa-
tion. Consumers loose in all regions, but these losses are
smaller than the gain in producer rents. Boeing has higher
profits in the base case situation than two American pro-
ducers in the hypothetical duopoly. Apparently the cost of
late entry are more than compensated by another seemingly
counter-intuitive effect.
Two forces, the scale and scope effects and the competitive
effect, can explain this result. Because of increasing re-
turns to scale the social optimum is one producer with mar-
ginal cost pricing and large output and consequently lower
average and marginal cost. Insofar the simulated duopoly
situation forces both producers up their average cost
curves.
In the base case Boeing, of course, has lower and Airbus
higher marginal cost than in the reference situation. But on
average both producers together produce at lower average and
marginal cost in the base case. This advantage does not show
up in prices, it goes to Boeing in the form of profits.
Therefore market entry of Airbus has forced Boeing into more
competitive behavior than in a monopoly situation, but since
Airbus is only a small producer the scale effects of Boeing
with its projected market share of around 60% are strong
enough to compensate for the high cost production of Airbus.
The simulations and the two alternative welfare comparisons
in table 4 show that there is a conflict between competition
effects, i.e. indirectly consumer welfare, and scale ef-
fects, i.e. overall welfare. Although the market is simulat-
ed to sustain two equal producers, welfare is larger in a
monopoly situation and even an inefficient second producer- 23 -
with small market shares is better than the hypothetical
duopoly. This suggests that in the market for large trans-
port aircraft scale and scope effects are strong enough to
outweigh the output reducing effects of increasing market
power and - in the extreme - of a monopoly. If the model
represents the replacement of an established American pro-
ducer by an European entrant, Airbus, the regional distribu-
tion of welfare changes looks ironic. Only North-America
gains from the Airbus market entry.
PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES
Up to now simulations of industrial policy have only
focussed on supporting market entry by subsidizing start-up
investments. This policy has the effect of changing the in-
cumbant's pricing policy. Entry deterring pricing strategies
are not rational, if the commitment of European governments
is credible as it was in the case of Airbus. These subsidies
do not, however, influence the capacity game between the two
producers. This can only take place if output decisions are
influenced by production or price subsidies. It has been
shown by BRANDER/SPENCER (1985) that the optimal export sub-
sidy rate is that which moves the reaction function of the
subsidized firm to that point which would have been chosen
by the firm, if it were in a Stackelberg-leader position.
Since in the present case not only exports but production in
general is subsidized and there is domestic consumption, the
optimal subsidy is higher than a subsidy on exports alone.
In order to determine the optimal subsidy for Airbus alter-
native subsidy rates have been simulated. It was assumed
that only those aircraft types are subsidized in which
Boeing has an advantage in terms of learning effects, i.e.
short to medium range narrow-bodied and long range aircraft.- 24 -
The Cournot-Nash game is played in the same fashion and
parameter values are unchanged. Figure 1 summarizes the
output effects of increasing subsidization of Airbus. Output
is measured in total number of aircraft produced. Total out-
put increases by only 6.6% if Airbus is subsidized with a
20% subsidy on price. Although only aircraft in two market
segments is subsidized, Airbus increases its market share in
all three segments: from 31% to 60% in the short to medium
range, from 53% to 61% in the medium range wide-bodied, and
from 45% to 53% in the long-range market.
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Figure 2 summarizes the welfare effects of increased sub-
sidization. Profits increase faster than subsidies which
does not come as a surprise since Airbus realizes learning
effects through larger production, but since Boeing can sell
fewer aircraft prices fall only slightly. Subsidization in a
sense induces a transfer of learning effects from Boeing to
Airbus leaving consumers relatively unaffected. European
consumer surplus net of subsidy payment decreases, e.g. from
$ 33 billion to $ 5.5 billion in the case of a 20% subsidy.
The effect on American and rest of the world consumers and
producers is essentially the opposite. There are small gains
in consumer surplus due to a slight fall in prices both in
the United States and the rest of the world. Boeing's loss
in profits is larger than Airbus's profit increases net of
subsidy payments. World welfare decreases by less than 1%.
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Production subsidies have been varied over a large range,
but there is no profit or welfare maximizing subsidy like it
is theoretically derived in BRANDER/SPENCER (1985). For sub-
sidies higher than 22% no equilibrium can be simulated. The
reason for this result is essentially the same as the one
for the welfare effects of market entry of Airbus in the
previous section. Airbus profits net of subsidies as a
function of subsidy rates are S-shaped as shown in Figure 3
with an inflection point around a subsidy rate of 10%. This,
incidentally, is also the minimum of world welfare (Fig. 3)
and at this subsidy rate Airbus and Boeing have approximate-
ly equal market shares. The previous section has already
shown that a monopoly is in overall welfare terms superior
to the current situation and even to a duopoly of two iden-
tical producers. Welfare effects of production subsidies
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follow the same logic. Increased subsidization of Airbus
first leads to an equalization of market shares and there-
fore to higher unit cost on average. Hence world welfare is
reduced and the cost advantage of Boeing becomes smaller.
Only when subsidization increases beyond 10%, the difference
in marginal cost become large enough to ensure that profits
increase at a faster rate.
Regardless whether from a pure profit transfer perspective
or an European welfare perspective it would be advantageous
to subsidize the domestic firm to such a degree that foreign
competitors are driven out of the market. This particular
simulation result for the aircraft industry depends predo-
minantly on the assumed existence of large economies of
scale and barriers to entry. Even though the market is large
enough to support two firms - at least in the calibration of
this model -, a monopoly is superior to a duopoly in terms
of world welfare. This result will most likely be true for
industries with similar degrees of economies of scale. In
that sense, there is a strong incentive to support one's
domestic industry. Although in the present model Airbus is a
producer with higher cost it is advantageous to support the
inefficient firm. These arguments, of course, remain valid
only as long as retaliation from foreign governments is not
considered.
RETALIATION
The same logic according to which it is advantageous to sub-
sidize Airbus of course applies to subsidizing Boeing. This
even more so since Boeing has lower unit cost because of in-
corporated learning effects from prior production. Both
governments therefore have equal incentive to subsidize
their respective industries. The interaction of possible- 28 -
outcomes is shown digrammatically below. Whether any
















In BRANDER/SPENCER (1985) a Nash equilibrium in export sub-
sidies exists. It is a Prisoner's Dilemma since both coun-
tries could be better off by jointly reducing subsidy
levels, but would be worse off by unilaterally reducing sub-
sidies. The equilibrium is characterized by a joint Stackel-
berg-equilibrium. In the simulation model of this paper an
optimal unilateral subsidy level is not compabible with the
existence of two firms. The same is true for retaliation
against any subsidy which is low enough to allow both firms
to stay in the market. Retaliatory subsidy rates also in-
crease welfare of the retaliating country up to the point
where the foreign firm is driven out of the market. Evident-
ly there is no Nash-equilibrium in government subsidies in
this model.
Although the outcome of subsidization with retaliation is
uncertain, in the particular case of Airbus subsidies and
potential American retaliation some inferences about the
effectiveness of retaliatory measures can be made. Since
It is important to note that this comparison excludes all
external economic or policitical cost of such governmental
action.- 29 -
Boeing is on a lower part of its learning curve than Airbus,
one can expect that subsidies to Boeing will have a larger
impact on Airbus than vice versa. Figure 4 illustrates si-
mulation results of alternative levels of subsidies. On the
reaction function of Boeing equilibria with unilateral sub-
sidy rates of European governments to Airbus are shown. For
a 10% subsidy to Airbus retaliation of the American govern-
ment through alternative subsidy levels are also simulated.
They are represented by the points tracing out the reaction
function of Airbus. One can easily see that rather low sub-
sidy rates bring Boeing output back to levels without sub-
sidization of Airbus. A 3% subsidy to Boeing costing about
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Subsidy rates are shown in brackets of Figure 4.- 30 -
$ 4 billion against a 10% subsidy to Airbus amounting to
$ 14 billion will bring Boeing output back to pre-subsidy
levels and will therefore save the learning advantages
vis-a-vis Airbus. Airbus profits will still be $ 10 billion
higher than in the case without subsidization, but net of
subsidies an additional ~ loss of $ 4 billion will be in-
curred .
The question mark in the pay off matrix above will therefore
clearly show that Boeing will most likely win a subsidy race
against Airbus. Given this result the American government
would have a dominant strategy consisting in subsidizing the
production of Boeing in order to eventually reach a monopoly
position. The European governments, on the other hand, do
not have a dominant strategy. Given the dominant strategy of
subsidizing Boeing, the sophisticated strategy of Europe and
Airbus would be to close down Airbus instead of retaliating.
The dominant American strategy, of course, is an unrealistic
hypothetical situation, since for external political reasons
the American government will not unilaterally start to sup-
port Boeing. If a production subsidy race might start it
will be initiated by Airbus subsidies and in that case the
threat of retaliation by the United States is highly
credible, since comparatively low subsidization has a strong
impact on Airbus. It would be therefore rational for Euro-
pean governments not to start subsidizing Airbus.
CONCLUSION
In this paper the allocation and welfare effects of indus-
trial policy measures in an industry with strong economies
of scale and high entry barriers have been investigated.
Production of large transport aircraft has often been con-- 31 -
sidered to be a prime candidate for which potential welfare
gains through industrial and trade policy measures could
materialize in a way similar to theoretical predictions. A
stylized simulation model of competition in the aircraft
industry is developed focussing on two distinct industrial
policy measures: the support of European governments to
Airbus Industrie in entering the market for large transport
aircraft and, secondly, the potential impact of production
subsidies taking into consideration unilateral action as
well as possible retaliation.
Welfare effects of government supported market entry in the
aircraft industry are somewhat difficult to interpret,
because learning effects and economies of scope are so im-
portant that a monopoly would be maximizing world welfare -
not considering distributional aspects. At the same time the.
market is large enough to support two producers. It is also
ambiguous to which hypothetical situation government sup-
ported market entry of Airbus Industrie should be compared.
When Airbus entry is compared to a Boeing monopoly overall
welfare decreases. This is so, because monopoly profits dis-
appear and consumers gain in all regions, but by less than
the profit loss. The reason for this result is, that the
scale and scope effects of producing large transport air-
craft are strong enough to outweigh the output reducing
effects of a Boeing monopoly. From the viewpoint of European
governments Airbus market entry as an "anti-monopoly" policy
was not a successful policy. Only consumers in the rest of
the world will gain. The negative welfare change does not
come from the inefficient scale of production of Airbus
relative to Boeing. This becomes apparent, when market entry
is compared to a situation with two established American
producers.- 32 -
The high-cost production of Airbus yields higher welfare
than a duopoly with two identical firms, because the scale
effects of the large producer in the unequal situation
dominate the competitive effects. Since consumers in all
regions loose from Airbus entry and the American producer,
Boeing, gains more than American consumers loose, the market
entry of Airbus yield a positive welfare change only for
North-America.
The basic logic behind these results is not special to the
aircraft industry. If economies of scale are large enough a
market structure with a few number of firms can emerge which
is in welfare terms inferior to a monopoly. Because two or
more firms can profitably stay in the market, economies of
scale remain unexhausted and - at the same time - are larger
than the losses in consumer surplus from monopoly pricing.
In asymmetric situations, e.g. one large and one small firm,
scale effects also come into play. In a symmetric equili-
brium economies of scale are exploited to the least extent.
The more asymmetric the equilibrium, the more consumers can
gain from realized economies of scale of the large producers
and still have the more competitive output policy. This
logic is present in the analysis of production subsidies as
well.
Airbus with a market share of about 30% is the smaller firm.
Unilateral subsidization of Airbus will reduce world welfare
because of the scale effect just mentioned. The welfare
minimum is indeed reached when both producers have approxi-
mately equal market shares. Beyond that point it increases
until the other producer leaves the market. Because overall
welfare in a monopoly dominates oligopolistic industry
structures and because of the fact that usually newcomers
and relatively small industries are supported, the optimal
subsidy is one which drives the other firm from the market,
i.e. the Stackelberg-leader point is in a region of the
other firms reaction function in which it incurs losses.- 33 -
With subsidization amounting to a monopolization of the
market retaliation is the natural consequence. The simula-
tions show, that the incumbent large firm through small
retaliatory subsidies can easily be brought into a position
where support by the foreign government can be neutralized.
The ability and willingness to retaliate should therefore
effectively threaten any desire to improve the market posi-
tion of a small firm by subsidizing it.- 34 -
APPENDIX!
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